Introduction
How is environmental sustainability to be achieved? While considerable recent attention has focused on experiments in international governance (e.g. Haas, 1994) , this article explores the potential for nation-states to become primary contributors to 'sustainability governance' through the rationalization of state environmental roles. 1 This potential resides in the ability of nation-states to make environmental protection a basic goal by committing institutional resources toward the formation and implementation of substantive actions perceived necessary to mitigate those tendencies within socioeconomic systems that compromise ecological integrity. To date, most state-sponsored environmental action has been undertaken in the context of maintaining states' legitimacy vis-a-vis environmental protection. Such actions are necessary, but insufficient to achieve lasting sustainability in the absence of parallel commitments to rationalization.
The argument we develop in the following abides by the 'statesin-society' or 'embedded state' model developed by Evans and others (Evans, 1995; Migdal et al., 1994) . In that model, substantive state action is conditioned by states' linkages to civil society, when those linkages facilitate the clarification and pursuit of state goals without ceding control of state apparatuses to special interests. Extending this logic to environmental protection, we argue that environmental rationalization of state roles will depend critically on the types of linkages between nation-states and actors within civil society. Our initial effort to develop this perspective focuses on nation-state linkages with environmental justice movement organizations and environmental knowledge professionals. 2 We explore the nature of these civil society networks and their relevance for building environmental states. Our optimism is tempered by the understanding that opportunities to develop sustainability governance through such linkages will only emerge under conditions conducive to these networks' expansion and integration. While the analysis we present is theoretical, we draw empirical examples from the US case to illustrate several points. In the concluding section, we address the implications of our arguments for sustainability governance in developing nations. distinct mechanisms that instigate state action, each of which entails distinct motives, and usually, results. The first mechanism is legitimation, or the continuous provision of reassurances to citizens and businesses that states are performing their mandated responsibilities that typically emerge in response to political pressure (Habermas, 1975) . The second mechanism is aforementioned processes of rationalization that encompass the formation of new state institutions (e.g. environmental ministries) as well as significant reform of existing state institutions. With rationalization, environmental sustainability becomes a consistent mandate of the state apparatus writ large. 3 Both mechanisms are necessary to continued state effectiveness, yet neither is sufficient in the absence of the other. In order to develop an understanding of the potential for environmental state-building, particularly in light of the interdependent relationship between legitimacy and rationalization, we first outline the means by which legitimacy works as both necessity and formidable hindrance to the rationalization of state roles toward sustainability. In the section following, we focus on the environmental rationalization of state roles, including some possibilities for overcoming legitimacy challenges. 4 
Legitimacy Challenges to Rationalization
The central position of legitimacy in the maintenance of the nation-state's position as highest authority is exemplified in Weber's definition of a state as 'a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Mills and Gerth, 1958: 78) . The legitimacy of a nation-state is dependent upon the perception among its citizenry that the state is performing its ascribed roles, and has distributed goods and maintained order in an equitable and ideologically consistent manner. Since the decline of state legitimacy can be a significant source of political instability and challenge to administrative effectiveness and political order, maintaining legitimacy is an ongoing source of motivation for state agents (Habermas, 1975) . As Evans (1995: 5) puts it: 'All states would like to portray themselves as carrying out a project that benefits society as a whole, but sustaining this image requires continuous effort. ' Legitimation largely represents state responses to rapidly fluctuating pressures and priorities defined by interest groups in civil society. The strength of environmental organizations and broad public support for environmental protection has encouraged many nation-states to adopt environmental policies and institutions to maintain legitimacy. These actions, however, should not ipso facto be assumed to represent the rationalization of state roles toward responsibility for ecological sustainability (Buttel, 2000a) . As noted by several scholars (e.g. Gramling and Krogman, 1997; Freudenburg and Gramling, 1994; Molotch, 1970; Edelman, 1964; Redclift, 1996) , nation-states caught between the dual imperatives of economic expansion on the one hand, and responding to external pressures to protect the nation's natural resources and public health on the other, find recourse in symbolic acts that are sufficient to deflect criticism from environmental groups, while still promoting economic development. Although the passage of national environmental policies, the creation of environmental ministries, and the establishment of protected areas evident at a global level across the 20th century (Frank et al., 2000) may lead to real environmental improvement, in many cases such acts have the ability to stifle political unrest while accomplishing little else.
Conversely, efforts to implement more substantive environmental improvements have encountered acute opposition, as such actions often are perceived as a threat to economic welfare in general, and to the rights of private property owners, consumers and corporations in particular. Corporate interests wield tremendous power over state actions, either directly through lobbying, or indirectly through 'business confidence' (Block, 1987) . States that initiate substantive environmental actions in an attempt to pursue political legitimation in response to environmental concerns consequently introduce the potential for significant challenges in economic legitimation. Even for states that have moved beyond symbolic politics and adopted sustainability as a central responsibility (see later), efforts at economic legitimation can constrain the effectiveness of stateled environmental improvement actions in at least four ways.
First, when corporate power over state interests is sufficiently strong, environmental improvement is limited to those environmental 'goods' that can effectively be commodified, and for which the solution mechanism is more cost efficient in the short term than living with the problem. Issues such as resource consumption, biological diversity, and environmental equity are removed from the agenda by default (Weidner, 2002) . To overcome this constraint, states would need to convince corporate actors that environmental problems are real economic threats, that less harmful production alternatives exist, and that greener production represents an economically viable -although long-term -strategy. Second, environmental improvements that rely on market mechanisms may entail negative social impacts. For example, small businesses often find environmental improvement measures such as pollution control technologies difficult to afford. Moreover, in instances where economic logics do begin to give way to environmental sentiments, anti-environmental groups and lobbieswise use groups, conservative foundations and think tanks, and industry trade associations -often emerge to delegitimize pro-environmental standpoints, and add political muscle to expansionist pressures (e.g. McCright and Dunlap, 2000) . Third, many businesses and governments simply respond to domestic pressures for environmental improvement by exporting the problem. Developing nations, and underdeveloped regions of industrialized nations, have been utilized as the 'environmental sinks' of capitalist expansion, becoming sites of ecologically devastating extractive industries and waste depositories for global production (Frey, 1998; Redclift, 1996) . Simply put, the politics of global finance and distributional inequalities in resource use and waste disposal between core and peripheral states represent significant counter-influences to international sustainability efforts (Bunker, 1996) . Finally, participation in international trading regimes may further exacerbate these imbalances. Corporate actors will resist any pressures to internalize environmental costs that can be interpreted as a threat to international competitiveness. Trade agreements such as NAFTA and GATT may provide a more explicit threat to environmental improvement, if it can be argued that such improvement measures serve to protect domestic producers (Mann and von Moltke, 1999) .
In short, environmental improvements undertaken in an effort to maintain political legitimacy are not likely to permit or support deeper reforms necessary to sustainability. The skeptical record of real environmental improvement despite extensive environmental legislation and bureaucratic commitment could be considered supportive evidence for this claim. Instead, the tendency has been toward environmental strategies that result in incremental, incoherent and at times conflicting policy and bureaucratic apparatuses (Hoberg, 1992; O'Connor, 1994; Wilds, 1990) , with a high propensity for symbolic actions designed to dissuade political conflict rather than address environmental issues (Edelman, 1964; Hajer, 1996) . The need for economic legitimation helps to explain the perpetuation of such symbolic actions, and serves as a formidable obstacle to deeper reform. While the maintenance of legitimacy is a fundamental component of the strength and stability of nationstates, it is more likely to serve as hindrance than impetus for a comprehensive system of sustainability governance. What is needed, in addition, is the rationalization of state environmental roles.
Building Environmental States
While legitimation operates largely as a state response to political and/or economic pressures originating in society, the potential for state rationalization is predicated upon sufficient autonomy and coherence of state administrative bodies to foster the requisite administrative restructuring. Unlike legitimation, an ever-present source of incentive for state agents, nation-states tend to undergo periodic phases of rationalization separated by long periods of rigidity in state structure and function. Skowronek (1982: 10) identifies 'crisis', or 'a sporadic, disruptive event that suddenly challenges a state's capacity to maintain control' as a primary stimulus for rationalization. At least two points emerge from his analysis of the post-Civil War American state that are important here. First, the avenues for administrative transformation, even in 'crisis' moments in which basic questions of rule are raised, tend to be path dependent -constrained by pre-existing institutional arrangements and prescribed state roles. Rationalization does not involve the adoption of entirely new roles so much as it involves a redefinition of previously private spheres as components of primary state roles (Thomas and Meyer, 1984) , as when state managers determine that economic prosperity is necessary to military security (Tilly, 1975) , or that social welfare is necessary to internal order (Hicks and Misra, 1993; Quadagno, 1987) . Second, state rationalization does not occur solely at the behest of external pressures. Rather, members of the state apparatus itself must come to recognize an existing situation as a crisis for the state.
Following this logic, two of the more obvious potential triggers to environmental rationalization are declining natural resource supplies needed for economic growth (Young, 1981) and significant environmental disruption posing health hazards. History suggests, however, that neither is likely to elicit ecologically sustainable state responses in all -or even most -cases. Given the tremendous ambiguity associated with assessments of both natural resource supplies and environmental disruptions, state actions toward sustainability will be determined by the extent to which environmental dilemmas are defined, or socially constructed, not only in terms of environmental crises but also in terms of political crises, and are thus perceived as a threat to the ability of a given nation-state to continue to promote economic growth, maintain internal order and/or defend itself. While this is relatively easy to imagine in the context of 'environmental security' issues (Harris, 2001 ) such as regional conflicts triggered by water shortages or desertification, it is less easy to imagine in the current context of global warming -a 'crisis' that is in human terms all but invisible, slow to develop, and whose near-term effects for most seem to be indirect and subtle.
Consequently, the rationalization of state roles toward sustainability would seem to be highly dependent upon the potential for a new political discourse to emerge that effectively (re)defines those environmental conditions in terms that represent a crisis, not only in ecological conditions, but also as a crisis for the state itself. Political incentives to respond are thus highly dependent upon the means by which these conditions are defined and interpreted by certain social actors, and the position of these actors in the political order. Thus, the role of states in sustainability governance will be likely determined through struggles for discursive hegemony among actors with incentives to present alternative definitions of the environmental problematic.
Discursive struggles enter the political arena according to specific avenues defined by state-societal relations. The nature of such relations has been accorded significant weight in determining variations in state capacity for action (Evans, 1995) . Successful developmental states, according to Evans, are 'embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies' (Evans, 1995: 12) . Instead of states simply responding to interest groups that actively compete for the state's attention, as the pluralist ideal would depict, the state instead becomes an active agent in its own right. States seek out linkages with those entities in civil society that have skills and resources needed to pursue state goals, and avoid or restrict linkages with actors that threaten the pursuit of those goals.
Although Evans focused on the role of states in the development of the information technology sector, we believe that the embedded autonomy premise can be applied here. Specifically, the greatest potential to contribute to the enhancement of autonomous state interest in sustainability while still maintaining legitimacy lies in strengthening linkages between states and specific civil society actors. While there are certainly others, we believe that two civil society actors may be particularly important: environmental justice movement organizations (EJOs) and environmental knowledge professionals -especially those engaged in environmental health research. For the remainder of this article we turn our attention to these.
Linking Environmental Justice Movements, Science and the State
Increasingly scientists are collectively making the case that environmental degradation is not only ecologically catastrophic but economically deleterious as well (IPCC, 2001) . At the same time, EJOs are gradually accumulating evidence of the negative and unequal community, property and health impacts of economic development that lacks appropriate environmental precaution (e.g. Bullard, 1993; Cole and Foster, 2001; Szasz, 1994) . Such arguments cut to the heart of states' raison d'etre: the economic, civic and physical health of their citizenry. Fueled by these discourses and the empirical data that stand behind them, scientific and environmental justice organizations may represent strategic points of leverage for reconstructing political discourse on environmental dilemmas. Where such discourses emerge through embedded networks with the state, we may see expanded potential toward the development of ecologically sustainable management directives and politically viable implementation and enforcement mechanisms. To be sure, these points of leverage are paired with weaknesses that also constrain that transformative potential. As we describe in the following subsections, however, we believe that the relative strengths of these two civil society actors are in important respects complementary and, when in combination, have the potential to further sustainability governance through effective state-societal networks.
Environmental Justice Organizations
The success of mainstream environmentalism has meant increased access to the decision-making arena. However, success has also meant increased moderation and caution (Rootes, 1999) , leading some to believe the movement has compromised its radical position and begun to lean toward 'ecological modernization' (van der Heijden, 1999). 5 Environmental justice represents a social movement that is in many respects distinct in both form and content from mainstream environmentalism. For our purposes, the former involve the mobilization and radicalization of politically and economically marginalized groups subjected to disproportionate levels of environmental disruption and risk that are perceived as jeopardizing those groups' health, culture and livelihood. Also referred to as 'Environmentalism of the Poor' (Martinez-Alier, 2000) or 'Liberation Ecologies' (Peet and Watts, 1996) , local environmental mobilizations among marginalized groups are on the rise in developed and developing countries alike. With the help of emerging international organizational networks that serve to link these mobilizations, environmental justice has become a broadly international movement, albeit one that is shaped by national historical and cultural contexts as well as by the local experiences of oppression and struggle. Many scholars view EJOs as having a much greater potential to 'move society and economy in the direction of ecological sustainability' than their mainstream counterparts (MartinezAlier, 2000: 2; see also Bullard, 1993; Szasz, 1994; Uyeki and Holland, 2000) , while others emphasize the need to resituate local communities as central players in global environmental governance (Lipschutz, 1996) . Scholars attribute much of this political potential to the formation of a new master frame (Capek, 1993; Taylor, 2000) . By connecting environmental risk to community health and welfare, EJOs have redefined environmental issues in terms of civil, indigenous, women's and, most broadly, human rights (Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2000) . The movement's rights-based discourse has expanded the template of democratic struggle to involve not only the redistribution of goods, but also the redistribution of 'bads' (i.e. toxic waste), launching environmental politics into 'creative ferment' (Szasz, 1994: 4) . The image of working-class women attempting to protect their children from unseen and uncontrollable dangers, or rural peasants protecting local communal forests from international timber companies, resonates with the sentiments of a broad Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 sector of global civil society, and many national civil societies, in a manner that few mainstream environmental groups have been able to achieve.
International
The organizational structure of environmental justice movements, which remain rooted in local communities, also differs notably from mainstream environmental movements that are dominated by hierarchical organizations representing hundreds or thousands of dues-paying members. Since their emergence in the late 1980s (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) , national and transnational networks have provided activist training and resources, and have increased dramatically the political wherewithal of EJOs, but have not become centralized decision-making units in environmental justice campaigns (Caniglia, 2001; Capek, 1993; Schlosberg, 1997; Szasz, 1994) . Schlosberg (1997: 284) suggests that this 'critical pluralism' organizational strategy more effectively represents previously excluded political positions, incorporates the diversity characterizing environmentally marginalized groups and 'is more able to confront changes in the nature of power, capital, and political oversight of environmental problems'. If, as Beck (1995 Beck ( , 1999 asserts, the pluralized modernity of current social systems offers an opportunity structure for a 'reinvention of politics', EJOs may be significant players in directing this process.
Environmental justice organizations face several important vulnerabilities, however. In comparison to other interest groups with a stake in environmental policy, EJOs have limited access to the financial and political resources necessary to ensure a sustained role in the framing of environmental issues (Brulle, 2000: 241-7; Capek, 1993; Cole and Foster, 2001) . As Brulle (2000: 190, 219) reports, in the US, mainstream 'reform' environmental organizations dwarf EJOs in levels of average annual income (US$6.9 million compared to less than US$500,000) and average assets (US$4.6 million compared to US$150,000). At the same time, he notes that the percentage of annual income deriving from government and private foundation grants -both potential sources of cooptation -is more than 7 percent greater for EJOs than for mainstream groups (47.7 percent compared to 40.7 percent) (Brulle, 2000: 190, 220) . In general, EJOs are small, poorly funded and often financially dependent on the patronage of government agencies and private foundations. Together, Brulle argues, these factors make EJOs particularly susceptible to reformist pressures to modify the movements' radical discourse and protest tactics. Given the predominance in the movement of women, minorities and impoverished rural communities, these vulnerabilities are not likely to be remedied or offset without the development of networks with other organizations in civil society capable of mobilizing greater movement capacity.
A potential source of enabling resources is mainstream environmentalism. Although EJO leaders continue to voice criticisms (Chang and Hwang, 2000) , mainstream organizations are beginning to turn their attention to social justice issues. In 1993, for example, the Sierra Club board of directors adopted a policy on environmental justice that 'calls on all parts of the Club to discuss and explore the linkages between environmental quality and social justice, and to promote dialogue, increased understanding and appropriate action' (Sierra Club, 2002) . Other evidence indicates that in several high-profile environmental justice struggles, such as those in southern Louisiana documented by Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss (2001), major environmental groups -notably Greenpeace and Sierra Club -have worked to bring national and international political attention to local environmental justice struggles. Over the longer term, however, the inclusion of environmental justice issues in mainstream environmentalist agendas begs an important set of questions: is environmental justice radicalizing the environmentalist mainstream? Or is environmental justice in the early stages of cooptation by a larger shift toward 'ecological modernization'? It is too early to say for certain whether this shift portends a recommitment to substantive environmental policy reform or is better understood in terms of narrowing political opportunities for mainstream groups in the context of economic globalization and international neoliberalism. There is reason to suspect the latter, particularly in light of the historical exclusion of minority groups from environmental politics. While we have guarded optimism toward the recent trend of some mainstream environmental organizations to expand their agendas to consider social justice, we see much greater potential in the integration of EJOs with networks of environmental knowledge professionals.
Environmental Knowledge Professionals
To the extent that environmental struggles represent contests over the meaning and use of nature (Gould et al., 1996) , science has claimed and will continue to claim important and complex roles in those conflicts (Yearley, 1997) . Research conducted in the tradition of science and technology studies (Jasanoff et al., 1995) has generated numerous insights concerning the relationship of science to environmentalism and environmental policy-making, two of which are particularly pertinent here. First, science, even to its epistemic core, is integrally bound up with governance such that 'processes of knowledge creation, community formation, and expert institutionalization are themselves deeply political exercises with substantial implications for broader debates concerning how people . . . are going to live together on the planet' (Miller and Edwards, 2001: 3-4) . The second key insight involves an appreciation for 'how science is "represented" and how it is employed within social movements, interest groups, regulatory agencies, epistemic communities, [etc.]' (Buttel, 2000b: 28) . The upshot is that scientists' authority in environmental conflict is International Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 conditional. This conditionality often derives from states' contradictory orientations toward environmental knowledge as both a resource that buoys the state efforts at environmental protection and a burden that can frustrate its drive to facilitate capital accumulation. The Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol is one of the more recent and glaring demonstrations of these contradictory impulses and of the vulnerability of scientific opinion to political fiat. Because environmental science and environmental politics are in important respects mutually but unevenly constituted, the institutional contexts in which environmental knowledge claims are generated, contested and defended are crucially important to the capacity of environmental knowledge professionals to contribute to sustainability governance.
For purposes of the present argument, it is environmental scientists' institutional autonomy and social authority relative to other social actors engaged in environmental politics and policy-making that matter. Despite science's vulnerability to de/reconstruction, and despite its uptake and deployment into various social and political arenas, science remains a powerful and relatively autonomous source of epistemic authority in directing environmental reform toward sustainability goals. However, we should not assume that organizational actors in science are important only or simply as interest groups to be added to an ever-lengthening list. Rather, we would do well to consider the ways in which environmental knowledge professionals remain uniquely positioned (institutionally, organizationally, ideologically) 'in between' states and environmental movements. Research networks in the problem-oriented environmental sciences span disciplinary, sectoral, national-international and public-private boundaries. Those networks constitute bridging architectures that tie scientists to specific localities (field sites, laboratories) and link them to global communities. Sitting uncomfortably between and within the state and civil society, environmental knowledge professionals typically possess greater stocks of the very resources -epistemic authority, technical expertise and institutional access to state actors -that EJOs often sorely lack. Under appropriate conditions, these boundary-spanning research networks can facilitate the forging of social ties between state managers and civil society actors.
A potential critique of this argument is that it ignores the prima facie conflict among experts and EJOs. Creating 'synergy' between states and civil society involves developing organizational and interpersonal relationships based on norms of trust and cooperation (Evans, 1996) . Yet, as students of environmental illness have observed, 'regulatory agencies, health officials, and scientific organizations' are often 'key obstacles' in grassroots efforts to connect industrial effluents to human disease (Brown et al., 2000: 9) . Students of environmental geopolitics have similarly shown how scientific discourse constructs regional ecological dislocations (deforestation, wildlife population decline) as 'global environmental problems' requiring top-down, technocratic solutions that in turn have incurred significant resistance from EJOs in developing nations (Taylor, 1997; Jasanoff, 1993; Yearley, 1996) .
While in no way denying the reality or importance of these tensions, we question whether they are inherent or necessary. Here we take our cue from Evans (1996 Evans ( : 1130 On the practical side . . . those interested in fomenting social capital, even among groups that are normally excluded and oppressed, should not automatically assume that 'the state is the enemy'. The state may often be the enemy, but only in exceptional circumstances is it monolithically the enemy.
Similarly, if research in science and technology studies has contributed a third major insight instructive for our project, it is 'a stronger sense of the heterogeneity and variety of modern scientific practice' (Irwin, 1995: 47) , rendering generalized views of 'science', whether positive or negative, highly suspect. Indeed, the aforementioned authors also note the increasing importance of 'oppositional professionals' engaged in community efforts to understand and mitigate the environmental causes of disease 19; see also Kroll-Smith and Floyd, 1997; Roberts and Toffolon-Weiss, 2001) , and some of the most vocal critics of science-based global environmentalism are themselves environmental researchers (e.g. Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Shiva, 2000) . While negative cases no doubt abound, in other words, our argument encourages research that locates and examines positive cases in which environmental knowledge professionals and environmental justice activists have overcome whatever ideological divides are presumed to exist and are pursuing sustainable environmental reform in tandem.
At least in the US, two trends lead us to suspect that positive cases will be more plentiful than many may at first assume. One is the emergence and growing acceptance of a 'new breed' of scientist-advocate (Brown, 2000; Scarce, 2000: 167-70) . While historical research demonstrates that scientist activism is nothing new (Moore, forthcoming) , what may be changing is the professional reception these scientist-advocates receive. Although advocacy continues to generate disapproval within some disciplinary circles (Kaiser, 2000) , attaching policy recommendations to research or, even more heretical, pursuing research with an eye toward changing policy, seems increasingly less likely to result in censure. Indeed, some scientists such as Nobelists Sherwood Rowland and Mario J. Molina (ozone depletion), Joshua Lederberg (chemical genetic hazards) and climate change scientist Stephen Schneider have risen to national prominence as advocates for sustainability policies, with no apparent compromises to their International Sociology Vol. 19 No. 1 scholarly careers. If the professional costs traditionally associated with scientist-advocacy are lessening, we should expect this trend to continue as environmental justice concerns highlight the community-level implications of science-as-usual and provide a democratizing impulse to scientists' moral and political engagement with society.
Second, increasing reflexivity among environmental knowledge professionals is illustrated by the emergence of environmental science 'boundary organizations' (Moore, 1996; Guston, 2000) that intentionally manipulate boundaries between scientific research and political action. Environmental boundary organizations can take a variety of forms, reflect different ideological commitments and offer members a range of practices for combining environmental research and advocacy. At the reformist end of this continuum are special committees or offices established within existing professional science organizations that focus on public education and policy debate. For example, the Society of Wetlands Scientists, through its Wetlands Concerns Committee, makes available position papers in order 'to increase public understanding of wetland issues and promote sound public policy'. 6 The Ecological Society of America's Public Affairs Office similarly 'works to give ecological science a voice on Capitol Hill and in the Administration and federal agencies' by issuing congressional briefs and statements on issues such as genetically modified foods or road-less areas. 7 A more activist approach is found in boundary organizations such as the Center for Health, Environment, and Justice 8 that draw on publicly available information and on their members' own technical expertise to conduct and mobilize research 'in the public interest' (see Tesh, 2000) . A still more radical position is illustrated by organizations that engage in reflexive examination of science's relationship to the politics of sustainability to develop critiques of environmental science and science policy. For example, the Science and Environmental Health Network has been heavily invested in promoting the precautionary principle as a framework for conducting responsible environmental policy (Tickner et al., 1999) . To date, very little systematic research has been conducted on the organizational forms of scientist environmental advocacy (Frickel, forthcoming) , yet there is reason to believe that emerging networks of diverse science-based advocacy organizations are playing important and changing roles in linking environmental justice movements to state actors.
The Synergistic Potential of Embedded Networks
Environmental justice organizations and environmental knowledge professionals frame environmental problems differently, occupy different social locations and command different forms of moral, social and epistemic authority. These differences complement one another in ways that can offset respective weaknesses and in combination may offer opportunities for building environmental states.
We noted earlier that EJOs have introduced a politically resonant master frame that is qualitatively distinct from both mainstream environmentalism's eco-centric discourse and from (the related) science-based technocratic discourse on global environmental change and global governance. Science-based global environmentalism has attempted to encourage states to assume responsibility for ecological well-being. Because such responsibilities in many instances are beyond, and in some cases contradictory to, the primary roles of states, this strategy has tended to encourage environmental policies designed to maintain legitimacy among an increasingly environmentally aware civil society, rather than address the root causes of environmental degradation. In contrast, the environmental justice frame's transformative potential lies in its capacity to successfully frame environmental degradation in terms of existing state roles, specifically, protecting the rights of citizens to health, livelihood, private property and democratic participation. At least in principle, this set of demands can serve to maintain state legitimacy even in the face of economic or corporate challenge while governments undertake actions toward sustainability, and at the same time can reduce the potential for the development of environmental policy with negative social or distributional ramifications.
Thus, perhaps ironically, the anthropocentric values enshrined in environmental justice discourse may be instrumental in furthering sustainability governance goals. Resource extraction, production and waste disposal facilities that tend to be the focus of localized environmental justice struggles around the world in the aggregate constitute the (cumulative) source of several global environmental change processes, including climate change, ozone reduction and biodiversity loss (Turner et al., 1990) . Environmental justice discourse serves to reinforce the easily forgotten truism that even global systemic environmental problems have local/regional origins (rain forests, smokestacks, strip mines, cities) and outcomes (flooding, storm damage, infectious disease) (Lipschutz, 1996) .
If the material bases of ecosystem dislocation and public/community health are intertwined, then so might be their solutions. Although it may appear counter-intuitive, we believe that the best odds for achieving those solutions lies in developing the case for environmental justice and working to extend the logic of rationalization to protect what Bell (1998: 27) calls 'the rights and beauty of nature'. In this scenario, nature would benefit directly from states' mandates to protect the health of citizens and communities, reflecting a concrete link between social justice and ecological well-being.
Environmental justice discourse also converges with science as it directly implicates the research needs of local communities and the resources and programs of national public health systems. In the US and probably elsewhere, the state's commitments to environmental knowledge are unequally distributed across the environmental sciences in ways that ostensibly favor environmental justice concerns. Federal research and development budgets for health sciences outnumber environmental sciences by a factor of nearly 10 to 1. 9 Moreover, there is currently no independent, non-regulatory agency in the US devoted to research on natural resources, ecological systems and/or sustainability that parallels the federal government's commitment to environmental health (via the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the National Institute of Occupational Health and others). 10 As a pragmatic matter, there are some obvious affinities that connect environmental justice concerns to public health sciences and opportunities exist for influencing federal research programs that should be exploited (see, for example, Institute of Medicine, 1999; Lee, 2002) . Thus, the environmental justice master frame not only resonates with a broad sector of civil society, but also with existing primary roles of nation-states and -at least in industrialized nations -with the existing organizational infrastructure of biomedical and health sciences research. This congruity may help offset threats to the legitimacy of nation-state actors when instituting environmental reforms, and may provide EJOs with an effective counter to the elitist and sometimes dictatorial policy incentives that can emerge from research on global environmental problems (Sarewitz, 2000) .
Contexts and Implications
The foregoing discussion is based on certain assumptions about political and economic conditions that hold within nation-states and internationally at any given historical moment. Our own enthusiasm for those arguments, accordingly, is tempered by our recognition that the dynamics currently shaping environmental geopolitics involve certain conditions that may challenge efforts at sustainability governance. At the national level, the environmental justice master frame's cultural resonance will depend on a host of factors, including level of democratization, presence or absence of 'pro-environment' state actors and organizations, and degree of internal ethnic conflict (both overt and latent). More broadly, the environmental justice movements' rights-based discourses may not capture sympathetic political attention in the context of rising global political violence and economic recession in many world regions. Two other important global-level factors that will shape individual nationstates' odds for building environmental states are the distribution of scientific resources and the distribution of chronic environmental problems.
Although accurate estimates are difficult to come by, the vast majority of world science is produced in and directed by a handful of highly industrialized countries (Shrum and Shenhav, 1995) . 11 This suggests that environmental state-building will be more likely in industrialized nations, where world science is heavily concentrated and where wellestablished indigenous communities of environmental knowledge professionals have routinized access to state actors. It follows that in advanced industrialized nations we would expect strong EJOs to be most likely to foment state action toward sustainable governance when social ties to state actors are mediated by research networks in the environmental health sciences. On the other hand, environmental conditions in many developing nations are sufficiently severe that their governments have already defined environmental crises (e.g. lack of clean drinking water, rapid desertification, debilitating urban air pollution) as central concerns of the state. The several newly established states bordering the Aral Sea, for example, took as one of their first state-building initiatives the establishment of an international agreement to address the severe ecological degradation that had accumulated in this watershed due to several decades of exploitation under Soviet rule (Weinthal, 2002) . The persistence and severity of ecologically detrimental conditions underscore distributional imbalances that characterize the global flows of pollution and raw materials: poor nations do not have the luxury of exporting their problems or of using indigenous technology to 'fix' them. Where integrated networks of activists and scientists do emerge in developing countries, they will most likely occur with the integral support of international scientific and environmental justice networks. Domestic environmental justice and environmental science organizations in developing nations will consequently be heavily dependent upon linkages to international networks in environmental justice, and in the environmental life sciences.
Notes
This article was substantially strengthened by comments we received from Paul Gellert, Daniel Kleinman, Steven Wolf, the Editor and three anonymous reviewers of International Sociology. All errors remain our own.
1. In this article we leave aside the issue of the social construction of 'sustainability' as a political discourse, on which a sizeable literature already exists (e.g. Sachs, 1997; Yearley, 1996) . We agree with Buttel's (1998: 265) summation that despite definitional ambiguity, the terms sustainability and sustainable development 'focus our attention on the two great contradictions of the world today: the long-term compromising integrity of ecosystems . . . and the tendency toward reinforcement of the socioeconomic processes of social exclusion of billions of the world's people'.
